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Denial of coevalness as an Epistemic Injustice  
Andrés Calderon Ramos 
 
Introduction 
In this thesis we will outline why denial of coevalness should be considered an 
epistemic injustice. In section 1 we will state what constitutes an epistemic 
injustice, and shortly touch upon why we think that denial of coevalness could be 
qualified as an epistemic injustice; by the end of this work, we should have shown 
that calling denial of coevalness a practice of epistemic injustice was justified. 
After those opening remarks and clarifications, we will proceed to section 2. In 
section 2.1 we will explore the idea of denial of coevalness as proposed by the 
German anthropologist Johannes Fabian, then in section 2.2 we will proceed to 
explore the understanding and usage of that term by Argentinian philosopher 
Walter Mignolo. 
   The reason for exploring two different authors that use the concept, 
fundamentally, in the same manner has its explanation in the fact that while 
Johannes Fabian is mainly interested on how the denial of coevalness has been a 
part of the anthropological practice, specially in anthropological writing, and he 
focuses his research in its occurrences after the Enlightenment, Walter Mignolo 
proposes that the first denial of coevalness occurred when Spanish/European 
explorers/colonizers arrived in what today is called Latin America. Furthermore,  
Mignolo focuses on how the denial of coevalness extends to other fields, such as 
philosophy. We will explore the encounter of the Spanish/European with the 
“Indians”, guiding our research by the insights found on Mignolo’s and Todorov’s 
writings referring to this period so that we may understand, through a paradigmatic  
example, what denial of coevalness amounts to. 
   Then in section 2.3 we will explore how this denial of coevalness that happened 
in the meeting between colonizers and indigenous people, and that was deepened 
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through anthropological and ethnological research, is still happening today. In 
section 2.4 we will try to outline the positive understanding of the term coevalness 
in the writings of Fabian and Mignolo. We will analyze the problems and limits that 
both Fabian’s and Mignolo’s proposals may have, as both treat coevalness only as 
being denied from certain people, while the positive account of coevalness 
remains very vague in both thinkers. In section 3.1 we will describe José Ortega y 
Gasset’s own idea of coevalness, indicating the features that may help us develop 
a stronger concept of coevalness. In section 3.2 we will summarize and confront 
these ideas, and attempt to build a concept of coevalness that overcomes the 
epistemic injustice. 
   To avoid misunderstandings we will start by clarifying that this is not a thesis 
rooted on postcolonial theory1, thus we don’t ground the following thoughts on the 
writings of Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, or Homi K. Bhahba; that 
said, there are parallelisms with the projects, Fabian himself saw in Said writings a 
confirmation of the plausibility of his own claims, yet his book didn’t have Said 
“Orientalism” as an inspiration, so we will have some brief notes where the 
thematics overlap. Mignolo makes a distinction between decolonialism and 
postcolonialism, and one of those distinctions is the authors that are taken as a 
starting point, while postcolonialism is rooted on a theoretical background 
consisting of European thinkers, such as: Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, 
Jacques Derrida and Antonio Gramsci, decolonialist thinking tries to root itself on 
the colonial experience, so it tries to analyse both the ancient voices of the 
“locals”, as well as their current complaints. 
   A further reason for us choosing to avoid Postcolonialism is the area of conflict 
we’re exploring: postcolonial thinking has been rooted on experiences of 
Imperialism in Africa and Asia, and take as a starting point the 
Imperial/Enlightenment period, thus focusing on the experience and writings from 
                                                 
1 For a detailed overview on the difference between decolonial and postcolonial projects see Mignolo, W. 
(2011). 
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the European nations that mainly invaded those areas, linking Orientalism with the 
French and English experience and their respective colonies, other countries and 
colonies may appear on their writing, but the main focus is always on those 
nations; we will focus more on the Colonial/Renaissance, and the area call the 
Americas or the Indies that they “discovered”, while focusing on the experiences 
and writings from the Spanish nation, thus making the present work more akin to a 
decolonial position than a postcolonial stance, that said, we will point out, as 
stated on the previous paragraph, some parallelisms between both projects, as 
well as some divergences when we will find the comparison fruitful for elucidation 
on some issue; a decolonial voice and a postcolonial voice are not necessarily 
opponents to each other, we’re not taking a polemical stance to the postcolonial 
project, ideally what a decolonial position amounts to, is a further voice to sharpen 
concepts and to exchange concerns and ideas with different projects for a more 
including future. 
   Throughout this work we will try to shape coevalness into a term that is 
fundamental in epistemic relations, a necessary ingredient to have a meaningful 
interaction with the other speaker/knower, a dimension that, if not affirmed, will 
always produce an epistemic disadvantage and will block meaningful epistemic 
exchange between knowers, for the time being we will define coevalness as an 
equal sharing of the present time; the main focus of this thesis is to show the 
epistemic harm produced when another person or group of people is denied 
coevalness, while there are certainly ethical and political questions that are linked 
to this phenomenon, we will not deal with them directly. We decided to tackle this 
topic because we believe that denial of coevalness still exists, and hopefully 
explaining how it came to be, and how it was solidified, will help us find a solution 
on how to dissolve this situation. 
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1. Epistemic Injustice 
 
1.1 What is Epistemic Injustice? 
   Given how we normally think about justice in philosophy, the idea of epistemic injustice might first 
and foremost prompt thoughts about distributive unfairness in respect of epistemic goods such as 
information or education.2 
  In contrast to the opening lines of Miranda Fricker’s book regarding epistemic 
injustice, we will, for the purposes of this thesis, take a broader definition of 
epistemic injustice; we define epistemic injustice as the systematic harm done to 
a person regarding their capacities as a knower, based on their belonging of a 
certain group. This means that we consider epistemic injustice as prejudice 
toward the epistemic abilities possessed by an individual, such the capacity for 
epistemic agency, or developed epistemic resources, based on their 
appearance, language, social group, or any other external factor putting them in 
a weakened position in the face of their supposed listener or listeners. Fricker 
herself proposes two kinds of epistemic injustices: Testimonial Injustice and 
Hermeneutical Injustice. The first regards the unwillingness to seriously consider 
an individual statement merely because of their belonging of a group. The 
second concern is how this exclusion of certain individuals to influence the 
shared hermeneutical pool, may cause the hermeneutical resources that people 
use on a certain society to be shaped only by some members from the society, 
instead of all of them; this results in a further disadvantage for the excluded 
members, because they are already on a conceptual disadvantage given an 
epistemic conflict. These two injustices are not necessarily separate from each 
other, on the contrary, they tend to reinforce one another. Testimonial injustice 
causes the unjustly marginalized group to struggle in order to influence the 
                                                 
2 Fricker, M. (2008:5). 
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hermeneutical resources possessed by the main society,  and this in turn makes 
it easier to further marginalize the group, given that the society’s hermeneutical 
resources tends to ignore the concepts these marginalized voices are trying to 
propose.  
   There are other proposals regarding epistemic injustices, but in this thesis we 
will neither defend nor reject any specific position, instead we encourage that 
these proposals may be individually followed regarding the situation when a 
group is denied coevalness by the society. Given the dimensions and objectives 
of this thesis, it is in the interests of clarity to operate with a generalized concept 
of epistemic injustice, but we hope that further work will be done that takes into 
account the current discussions about defining different epistemic injustices. We 
believe that what is common to all the different definitions of epistemic injustice, 
is that we can identify that the knower’s ability as a knower, as being recognized 
as a capable epistemic agent, is either weakened, damaged or denied by 
another group, harming the possibilities of a just epistemic exchange; until both 
subjects are considered to be in a situation in which both can contribute to a 
meaningful exchange on equal grounds, injustice will continue to be committed. 
   Epistemic injustice is a subset, or a type of injustice, differentiated from other 
types and subsets of injustices by its focus on the epistemic dimension. One 
can commit some types of injustices without committing an epistemic injustice. 
Obversely, one can be harmed in many different ways without being harmed as 
an epistemic subject. Political and ethical injustice can happen while still 
respecting the epistemic attributes of the other subject. Epistemic injustice 
happens only when there is harm, a wrongful attitude or action regarding the 
epistemic abilities of a subject, be it that the subject is treated as a mere 
epistemic object, or that he/she is excluded from influencing the common 
hermeneutical resources pool, or dismissing his/her voice because of his/her 
identity, epistemic injustice always comes back to an injustice regarding the 
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epistemic abilities or expressions of a determinate subject or group. In all these 
circumstances, epistemic injustice tends to reinforce and be reinforced by other 
types of injustices, so it is not in conflict with other subsets of injustice. The 
implications and the motives that epistemic injustice has in connection with 
other types of injustice are too broad and context-dependent to be fully analyzed 
in a paper of this length. Rather, this work will aim to construe and analyze how 
certain views and goals were conducive to committing the epistemic injustice of 
denial of coevalness, and how, when it became accepted, denial of coevalness 
helped to establish other injustices toward the people who had been wronged. 
  I’ve chosen to focus on the idea of epistemic injustice, instead of epistemic 
violence or epistemic oppression,  for the following reasons: The term violence 
elucidates the harm that epistemic injustices may produces, but the term seems 
to pose a necessary antagonistic interaction. Epistemic injustice seems to allow 
for a broader view of harms being committed , among which is a refusal of true 
epistemic interaction. Epistemic injustice can happen even with the best of 
intentions. In addition, the term “violence” seems to forge a path where the ones 
that have actively produce epistemic violence to the marginalized group  are the 
ones that have all the responsibility to change, while a condition of epistemic 
injustice seems to leave a place for a just kind of epistemic interaction, where 
both parts contribute to the epistemic exchange. As for the concept of epistemic 
oppression, this seems to be dependent on the willingness, an intentionality, of 
the oppressor to oppress other epistemic agents. As we will see in the sections 
that follow, this is not the only way to deny coevalness. Indeed, coevalness can 
be denied without full consciousness, or even because someone is trying to 
help. Nevertheless such a case would constitute an epistemic injustice, though I 
am not sure whether it would constitute an epistemic oppression. This being 
stated, both epistemic violence and epistemic oppression are relevant may 
overlap with epistemic injustices, as such we should be aware that some cases 
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of denial of coevalness could be understood under the framework of those 
concepts.  
  Given that epistemic injustice is not incidental, analysis of specific cases tends 
to illuminate how a society may be structured. Understanding how epistemic 
injustices come to be, and how a group suffers from them are fundamental for 
changing the injustices in which are built into some societies. It also gives us a 
new understanding of certain practices and opinions, while giving us new 
perspectives when we look at our collective histories. Understanding our 
problems is the first step to changing the inequities that still exist on our 
societies. This thesis aims toward helping us be more conscious of them and 
presses for a change of attitude regarding certain ideas that still prevail in our 
times.  
 
1.2 How is denial of coevalness related to epistemic injustice? 
     We shall briefly define coevalness as a sharing of present time, claiming that it 
is a fundamental dimension for just epistemic relations between epistemic 
subjects. We believe that if coevalness between epistemic subjects that share a 
present time is denied, then an epistemic injustice will be inevitably committed. 
(see section 2.1) When there are two or more groups sharing a territory engaging 
in constant interaction, and one or more of these groups is believed by the majority 
to belong to a time different than the one of our common present, then these 
groups are being harmed in their epistemic abilities. As a consequence they could 
be marginalized in epistemic debates or their positions could be disqualified in the 
present, based on the belief that they belong to a different, more primitive time, 
one that should not have any say on how we discuss or use our epistemic 
resources. When coevalness is denied then the possibility of an equal epistemic 
interaction is denied. The group or person whose coevalness has not been 
recognized will start from a disadvantaged position, in which his arguments and 
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opinions will be filtered through the belief that they are in some way backward or 
not fully developed. While considered as an epistemic subject this person or group 
can only be so in a deficient way, and will always remain in a disadvantaged 
position. For example, in an interview he will only have the role of the interviewee 
without being able to have the role of the inquirer. Thus his/her epistemic abilities 
are judged deficient to influence the way an interview should be constructed. The 
view that makes them a deficient epistemic subject, someone temporally situated 
in a previous stage of a homogenous line of development, makes these subjects 
perfectible, educable3, again defining their epistemic abilities as deficient in 
contrast to the main society. To maintain this view, different devices have been 
used, as we will see in the following chapters. 
  These have varied from the letters of the explorers, written with an European 
audience in mind, thus neglecting the views, sometimes even the reality of the 
people they were writing about. When drawing maps, certain peoples are based 
on the fringe, replacing the fantastical creatures who marked the borders of the 
unknown world. In such a way the native peoples were essentialized as in the 
famous questionnaires of the missionaries, in which the indigenous people had a 
say, but only insofar as they were considered carriers of information and memory, 
not as epistemic agents. 
  Denial of coevalness is a type of epistemic injustice, which means that it is not 
the only one, but that it usually is reinforced by other epistemic injustices. Not only 
that, but by being context dependent there are different factors that influence and 
deepen this epistemic injustice; social conditions such as class, gender and race, 
are interconnected with denial of coevalness, but the various ways they 
interconnect is too vast to fully do justice to on this thesis. Thus, we will not deal 
with any of these dimensions directly, but the reader must  keep in mind that these 
factors are not separated, but are interwoven in social opinion. 
                                                 
3 See Sullivan, S. (2007: 159-160). 
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   The denial of coevalness wrongly excludes and damages the voices of the 
groups to which it is applied; it contributes to solidifying other epistemic injustices 
such as testimonial injustice, creating a web where the epistemic subject finds 
himself/herself increasingly wronged by the society; if denial of coevalness stays in 
place, then there will be no possibility of a true epistemic encounter. We believe 
that being aware of this problem will contribute to solving it, while also helping to 
unravel the web of epistemic injustices. This in turn will make it more difficult for 
hermeneutical and testimonial injustice to happen unquestioned. As soon as we 
start reflecting on the motives and effects that arise from denying coevalness, we 
inevitably arrive at reflecting on other types and subsets of epistemic injustice. 
  This thesis aims to contribute to the literature on epistemic injustice. Among 
authors currently addressing similar problems we find Shannon Sullivan and Sarah 
Lucia Hoagland, Sullivan explores how the idea of Puerto Rico as something 
“almost american, but not quite”4, has been constructed, while Hoagland 
demonstrates how denying relationality5, may help strengthen some notions that 
further distanciates meaningful epistemic engagements between different social 
groups, this distance and ignorance benefits, almost exclusively6, the group that 
distanciates and obscures the relationality between groups in society. We argue 
that the concept of denial of coevalness has to play a role on this debate, seeing 
that it is a relevant issue from which marginalized people suffer. We also hope that 
the idea of epistemic injustice will also be added to discussion on postcolonial and 
decolonial literatures, where we think it might also develop necessary critiques by 
these movements with respect to hegemonic ideas that trouble the societies in 
which they are interested. 
 
                                                 
4 See Sullivan, S. (2007). 
5 See Hoagland, S. L. (2007). 
6 Here we could consider a notion of resistance that benefits the disadvantaged group, an interesting 
example may be found in what Michel De Certeau calls tactics as opposed to strategies. See De Certeau, 
M. (2000). 
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2. Accounts of Denial of Coevalness 
 
2.1 Exploring coevalness: What was denied? Johannes Fabian’s 
approach to the problem. 
   In his famous book “Time and the Other”, the German anthropologist Johannes 
Fabian introduced the concept of denial of coevalness. What does this concept 
mean? What does denying coevalness amount to? And why was Fabian 
concerned with the problem? Fabian notes how every ethnological experience, if it 
wants to be a meaningful experience, requires a shared time between the 
ethnologists and the subjects he studies. Otherwise there wouldn’t be any 
ethnological practice, and instead it would be mere observation. If the ethnologists 
wants to be more than a bystander, then he must interact with the population he 
studies; the “Other”, whom the ethnologist analyzes, and the ethnologist must 
share time for anything meaningful to happen, Fabian calls this experience 
“Intersubjective Time”, a Time that is created by the encounter of more than one 
subject in mutual interaction. An interaction that does not happen in an 
Intersubjective Time by definition does not exist. You always need at least two 
subjects, and in the absence of one them, what takes place is mere study of an 
object, but not mutual communication.  
   Fabian found a problem in the relationship between the ethnologist’s experience 
(that of individuals sharing space and time), and anthropologist’s writings, were the 
Other is characterized by his “theoretical absence”7. The Other disappears into the 
background as a mere object of an analysis, not an epistemic agent on how 
                                                 
7 Fabian, J. (1983: XI). 
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knowledge of himself, and of his people, should be organized; the voices of the 
Other are marginalized through the process of disciplinary writing carried out by 
the academic who organizes and “gives voice” to his own experience. Here many 
anthropologists search for “complete” objectivity, thus trying to “cleanse” their 
experience from any influence and remnants of subjectivity, and as a 
consequence of any intersubjectivity, aspiring toward an objective report on “true” 
knowledge. What happens to the Intersubjective Time, fundamental to the 
ethnological experience and the anthropological knowledge, when the voice of the 
Other disappears on the shaping of the writing? 
   Before we can continue, we will briefly clarify what Fabian considers the three 
major uses of Time8: 
   ° Physical Time: It serves as a parameter or vector in describing sociocultural 
processes. And while it is a parameter of cultural processes, it is not subject to 
cultural variation. 
   ° Typological Time: It does not measure movements, but it works more as a 
reference to the quality of states, such as: literate vs. preliterate, rural vs. urban, 
and so on. Fabian notes that Typological Time seems to be constitutive of 
anthropological discourse. 
   ° Intersubjective Time: As we have seen before, this Time focuses on 
communication and interaction as constitutive parts of human nature9. 
   In broad terms we could say that for Fabian, denial of coevalness is a failure to 
understand and practice fully Intersubjective Time, submitting its experience to a 
structure of Typological Time or Physical Time, to the point where the notion of 
intersubjectivity disappears. This phenomenon is easy to find in the scholars that 
were highly influenced by social evolutionists, considering that they put the Other 
in a different Typological or Physical Time from the start, and some of them even 
                                                 
8 Fabian himself makes use of capital letters when referring to these typologies, we will respect this 
decision and write time with a capital ߧTߨ. 
9 See Fabian, J. (1983: 22-25). 
13 
denied the contemporaneity of those who they were studying. However, the 
phenomenon is not restricted to this group of anthropologists, but also applies to 
practitioners of functionalism or of structuralism who leave Time out of the 
equation, either by circumventing it or preempting it10. Circumventing coevalness 
is understood as closing Time in a capsule for a specific population, meaning that 
different populations, or tribes, are regarded as having different Times, though 
each could be studied with a “timeless” theory and method. Fabian identifies 
relativist and functionalist theories and research as examples of this attitutìde. 
Different people are assigned to different “Gardens of Culture”, places that are 
unrelated to each other and that follow their own logic. By following the basic 
principles that each “Garden of Culture”, there is a definite exclusion from these 
people from the Time and present of the researcher and, by consequence, of the 
society he belongs to, preventing “their” Time to irrupt into “ours”. There is a 
border which societies cannot overcome, and thus, all these theories finish by 
creating distance between societies. While the practice has its value, in that it 
strives to understand a culture in its own terms, they result in encapsulating them, 
reducing them to a functioning of concepts, thus breaking the possibility of 
intersubjective exchange, and by consequence of true epistemic interaction 
between individuals. In addition, such methods deprive the cultures being studied 
a possibility of a true change in the organization of their society, and not a mere 
evolution or “natural” transformation of their society. Johannes Fabian emphasizes 
this matter continually: by encapsulating them with their concepts and in their time, 
the circumvention of Time amounts to depriving the culture of change. The people 
are “walled-in” by the limits that concepts determined them with, being unable to 
view anything outside their wall, they can only hope to talk and reflect within it, not 
about it, leaving the anthropologist as the sole individual who can “fully” 
understand this society. 
                                                 
10 See Fabian, J. (1983: 37-71). 
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   As for preempting coevalness, we think that this quote by Fabian will clarify what 
he means:  
Rather than walling-in the Time of others so that it cannot spill over into ours, this school 
simply preempts the question of coevalness. Its strategy is to eliminate Time as a significant 
dimension of either cultural integration or ethnography.11 
   The preempted coevalness tries to remove the subject as a source of 
knowledge, by making Time obsolete, and by reducing a society to principles, 
preempting coevalness results in depriving the people whose time has been 
preempeted from creativity, from being informers and shapers of knowledge. 
Instead, the anthropologist presents them as being fully informed and shaped by 
the concepts in the developing of “their” Time. 
   By not dealing with the issue of Time, by bypassing it, choosing to focus on the 
basic principles that make a society work, we have as a result an isolated culture, 
one that has cut off its connections with other societies; these anthropological 
practices have only served to amplify essentialization of the Other, as well 
removing creativity from the possibilities for the cultures that are being explored.12  
   The denial of coevalness has had political uses, from being one of the tools to 
justify colonization or imperialism, or for organizing hierarchies within a 
geographical space. For Fabian, as well as for us, the pressing issue is the 
epistemological one of denying the interlocutor a role as a knower, as an epistemic 
agent. This harm to their epistemological status allows further harms to be enacted 
against them; as soon as we deny them an epistemological standpoint, we start 
creating hierarchies, and they find themselves in a disadvantaged position; ruled 
out of the building of collective knowledge, these people’s voices are reduced to 
mere data containers.13 
                                                 
11 Fabian, J. (1983: 52). 
12 Here we could not on how Said also claims that the Orient has been essentialized, basically depriving the 
(different) peopl that live in it a Time in which to change. See Said, E. W. (1979). 
13 This idea is very similar to what Miranda Fricker calls ߧHermeneutical Injusticeߨ. 
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   The writing practice of the anthropologists submits their ethnological experience 
to a tabular and detached knowledge. They start submitting their experience 
through their cultural framework, excluding the way in which the natives would 
structure that knowledge themselves. When this happens the natives become a 
mere object of study, they find their voices erased from the production of 
knowledge and, thus, they become epistemic tokens that carry knowledge, not 
subjects that produce it. 
   Why does Fabian use the word coevalness and not contemporaneity, 
simultaneity, or synchronicity? For him both synchronicity and simultaneity refer 
only to events that happen at the same time, while contemporaneity asserts co-
occurrence in Typological Time14; while coevalness aims at something more: 
What I am aiming at is covered by the German terms gleichzeitig and Gleichzeitigkeit. The unusual 
coeval, and especially the noun coevalness, express a need to steer between such closely related 
notions as synchronous/simultaneous and contemporary. I take synchronous to refer to events 
occurring to the same physical time; contemporary asserts co-occurrence in what I called 
typological time.15 
   It refers to a common “occupation”, a sharing of time. That is to say, while the 
research might recognize the people, the tribes, they were studying as 
simultaneous or synchronous to their own, but this would be tantamount to saying 
merely that they are living in the same physical time. As already stated, this, is a 
necessary condition to do anthropological or ethnological work at all, otherwise 
they could not observe practices that were not there. The word “contemporary”, 
would signify that pre-literacy can cohabit with literacy, that some people would be 
practicing more advanced techniques or cultures, while others would still be stuck 
on the previous phase: though contemporary, researches could still deny the 
people coevalness. Recognizing contemporaneity, simultaneity, or synchronicity 
does not imply epistemic equality: in all of these instances we can deny a shared 
present, we could even claim that we can accept these three instances without 
                                                 
14 Fabian, J. (1983: 31). 
15 Fabian, J. (1983: 30). 
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ever referring to Intersubjective Time. Academic writing may grant both 
synchronicity and contemporariness to the populations they study, but this does 
not suffice to avoid reducing these populations to epistemic objects instead of 
recognizing them as subjects. Only by avoiding the denial of coevalness, can the 
epistemic status of these people be respected.  
   Fabian thinks that the academic nature of anthropological writings has 
contributed to the marginalization of local voices, as well as facilitating the denial 
of coevalness. In these anthropological reflections, where Intersubjective Time 
seems to disappear and the Other is deprived either of Time, or also to some 
extent of history, of a voice, or even epistemic agency. As an interesting 
counterpoint he mentions Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes Tropiques, yet the dominant 
practices keep denying the Other a coevalness in which to act, in which to be a 
subject. Belgian historian Berber Bevernage shares a similar hypothesis, but his 
interest is in the field of history and not anthropology. Bevernage, claims that the 
discourse of historians--we could even venture to say their writing-- can be 
regarded as a neutral discourse, one that limits itself to the description of past and 
present. Indeed, he gives five main characteristics of what historians believe time 
is:  
1.- time is homogeneous - meaning every second, every minute and every day is identical; 
2.- time is discrete - meaning every moment in time can be conceived of as a point on a 
straight line; 3.- time is therefore linear; and 4. time is directional - meaning that it flows 
without interruption from the future, through the present to the past; 5. time is absolute-- 
meaning that time is not relative to space or to the person who is measuring it.16 
17
 
   But Bevernage believes that discourses of history possess a performative 
dimension18, one that by ascribing different times, actually produces them. It 
breaks the temporal line, and produces a ‘distance’ between past and present, one 
that if conjoined with the Typological Time referred to by Johannes Fabian refers 
                                                 
16 Bevernage, B. (2013: 17). 
17 This resembles the idea of empty-homogenous time advanced by Benedict Anderson. See Anderson, B. 
(2006). 
18 Bevernage, B. (2012b: X). 
17 
to, helps distance the groups that have been ascribed as belonging to the past 
from our present decisions and our present conscience. In this way history helps, 
consciously or not, to further damage the epistemic position of some groups, 
excluding them from the present and ‘breaking-up’ the connection they might have 
with it. 
 
2.2 Spanish Colonialism: The Denial of Coevalness in “Latin 
America”19. Walter Mignolo’s account of Denial of Coevalness. 
La mirada del colonizador ignora la ancestral mirada profunda del indio para ver y entender 
esta tierra, como ignora su experiencia y su memoria.20 
   In his studies Walter Mignolo has utilized Johannes Fabian concept of “denial of 
coevalness” to explain what happened in the colonial meeting between Spanish 
and “Indigenous” people; he explains how the denial of coevalness, and not just 
denial of contemporaneity, was a part of every move of colonization, be it of 
space, of language, of memory or of time. While we will explore the genealogy and 
the specific instances of the ‘denial of coevalness’ that happened in the practices 
of colonization, we will also explore how denying coevalness is an epistemic 
injustice that goes beyond the colonization period and practices. While it is true 
that Johannes Fabian concerns himself with the anthropological practices and 
accounts, he doesn’t restrict his concept of “denial of coevalness” to them, he 
thinks that it is something that has happened in other contexts as well, and that it 
goes beyond a conceptions of mere physical time. Walter Mignolo thinks that one 
of those contexts was the colonial one, especially visible on the way the local ways 
of understanding were shadowed, silenced, or ignored.  
                                                 
19 The irony of having to insert the name of ߧLatin Americaߨ so that my chapter may be better understood 
is highlighted by the fact that the denial of coevalness was suffered by the people who didn’t spoke a 
Latin-related language, nor were directly related with Americo Vespucci. For a detailed analysis see 
Mignolo, W. (2005). 
20 Bonfil-Batalla, G. (1990: 30). “The stare of the colonizer ignores the deep ancestral stare of the 
indian to see and understand his land, as much as he ignores his experience and his memory”. 
My translation. 
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   Some colonialists, such as Columbus, did not make a great effort to establish a 
relationship with the locals, treating them more as “biological or zoological”21 
curiosities rather than as real epistemic agents. As pointed out by the Mexican 
philosopher Eduardo O’Gorman’s and the Bulgarian-French philosopher Tzevtan 
Todorov’s work, Columbus, as many other explorers/colonizers that came after 
him, didn’t formulate knowledge about the natives by observing them, but had an a 
priori idea on how they should be, and continuously looked for confirmation on this 
view; that means that the natives played a role of confirmation of the ideas 
Colombus, and other explorers/colonizers, thought that these natives should 
possess on previous knowledge, such as the writings of Marco Polo, or the 
mythical descriptions that also appeared in ancient maps and chronicles, the 
locals just served to confirm these preconceptions or, in the best of cases, modify 
them, but because of it this framework, there wasn’t a true epistemic interaction, 
as the voice of the locals didn’t have any weight on how they should be perceived 
by these explorers/colonizers; this practice of determining the other through 
previous models, instead of producing it through interaction, applies not only to 
people who colonized and thought little on the capacities and abilities of these 
natives, as Colombus himself, but it also applied to the myth of the “good savage”, 
defended by many missionaries on their mission to defend the rights of indigenous 
people, this myth made all the indigenous equal, believing all of them to have 
“more christian qualities”, and saying that they were always obedient to their 
masters, it made them enter an abstract model, while ignoring their revolts, while 
also making it sound as if the awful conditions they were submitted to didn’t 
change their attitude, all because the experience was always to be interpreted 
through the “good savage” lens; this led for a maintenance of knowledge on these 
people that could not go beyond the paradigms already set by the Spaniards and 
Portuguese. 
                                                 
21 See Todorov, T. (1998: 13–58). 
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   Others, like Hernan Cortéz, were more concerned to understand the way the 
natives acted and what were their beliefs22 than many of the other colonizers; this 
led to them being impressed by their productive practices (poiesis), praising the 
way they used technique and their way of building, but this admiration and 
recognition of their art (techné) was not usually extended to their abilities of 
possessing knowledge beyond the mere practical uses, on a cultural and 
epistemic level they never considered the local knowledge as anything but a 
primitive23 way of understanding nature, human relationships and divinity; they 
could be praised as incredible workers, builders, even artists but they could not be 
recognized as epistemic equals, and all their epistemic qualities had to be either 
thought of as deviant or as imperfect forms of the knowledge possessed by the 
colonizers. Mignolo sees in these colonizers a mentality that will lead to Francis 
Bacon “Novum Organum”, the mentality that considers an understanding different 
from the one that has been shaped by one’s own culture as a not yet developed 
knowledge, or even worse, as mere fantasy.24 As Mignolo sharply points out, 
differences were made into values, with the colonizers/explorers always deciding 
how to evaluate them. 
   Thinking colonization as a period unconnected with the ideas and concepts 
utilized on the Renaissance, and thus to the Enlightenment, is a big genealogical 
omission on how certain ideas solidified themselves on Western thought. The 
impact that the reports and the letters of the colonizers and missionaries had on 
shaping the structure of European thought has been an unexplored subject, one 
that Mignolo underlines as a reason for a lack of awareness to the injustices being 
committed to certain groups of people; we have to keep in mind that the letters 
                                                 
22 Not wit the intention of understanding their culture for knowledge itself, but as means of being more able 
to take advantage of this knowledge so that the may colonize/convert the indigenous people. See 
Todorov, T. (1998). 
23 As Pierre Clastres pointed out, the use of words such as primitive, just reinforce thesis kind of 
dichotomy, where the person attributing it, just reinstates it into their categorical thought. See Clastres, P. 
(1987). 
24 See Mignolo, W. (1998). 
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and reports are always for another European, so that both the producer and the 
receiver of the knowledge are foreign to the topic they’re sharing, but it is from this 
foreignness that the big schemas for this knowledge were be built, it is through 
letters and reports that the European world comes to build a knowledge about the 
“Americans”, the “Indies”, and their practices and knowledges, and the main way 
they approached these people is through their own background of ideas, it is an 
assimilation which can only result harmful for the natives of the Indies. 
   Even the most recognized defender of the indigenous populations, Fray 
Bartolomé de Las Casas couldn’t avoid categorizing the Indians as being a kind of 
barbaric people25, as not yet civilized, because they lacked alphabetic writing; he 
could try to defend them on a lot of grounds, but when he praised them he 
remarked their qualities because they portrayed a “christian spirit”, both the praise 
and the condemnations were only read as comparisons with the model the 
Spanish had, reducing them to either improvements, deficiencies or sameness, 
that these differences could be thought as different values was something that Las 
Casas did not consider. This practice is still practiced as we could see on a press 
conference made by the director of Spanish Television and Radio José Antonio 
Sanchez, on the first of April 2017, where he said that Spanish people never 
colonized any people, but that they only brought civilization; he did not only denied 
the big central cultures such as the Mayans, Aztecs, and Zapotecs with their 
complex economic and political systems, but he described the tribes and people 
who were conquered by them as being barbaric and in need of being evangelized 
and civilized; in this reasoning he places the populations in an imperfect or deviant 
state of humanity, one that can only be perfected or straightened by the arrival of 
the Spanish, bearers of the “true” knowledge, as soon as a nation, an individual or 
a society takes this stance, the person, society or nation they are investigating will 
find itself with the ability to communicate or think in an imperfect or deviant way, 
                                                 
25 See Mignolo, W. (1998: 129). 
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with the need to always be reconducted to the “right” kind of dialogue; this 
prevents for an equal epistemic exchange to occur, as one of the talkers will 
always find itself on a disadvantage position, with limited resources and a weaker 
position, in so far as is different, from the start26. 
   The way the indigenous utilized the paintings or the quipus, as ways of writing27, 
was not acknowledged, and all the differences were viewed as lack from the 
Other, Mignolo declares that it is in these practices that differences are made into 
values, and values are hierarchized, with the indigenous groups always being on a 
more disadvantageous position; while Todorov says that if there was a recognized 
single humanity, these assimilation that the Spanish colonizers brought 
conditioned them to see these other groups as imperfect. Using Fabian’s 
terminology, we could say that the colonizers mainly made use of Typological 
Time for understanding the place that these indigenous people should take in their 
contemporaneous world; the lack of (alphabetical) writing was considered a 
previous stage of man; other values, such as the lack of clothing, reinforced this 
view.  The indigenous practices and knowledge becomes just an object of 
curiosity, instead of being an epistemic voice, the difference practices are just 
taken to be more primitive or as of less value than those of the Spanish. He 
explains that regional aspects began to be universalized, and when they were 
universalized then they became the measure of everything else, from this point the 
locals of the New World could only be behind in their interpretations, based on a 
universalized picture, they were the farthest from the highest point of civilization, 
the more elements of this universal theory the lacked, the farther away they were 
from being coeval to the colonizers, thus the project of 
colonization/conversion/education merged into a single process. 
                                                 
26 One argument that Sanchez employs as justification for his belief that the Spaniards have never been 
colonizers, but instead carriers of civilization, is the great knowledge and role they played on the 
Renaissance, claiming that their knowledge of Dante and Michelancgelo was somehow enough to prove 
their inability to be cruel or uncivilized. 
27 See Mignolo, W. (1998 and 2005). 
22 
   What would have happened if they were seen as coeval? Then their social 
practices wouldn’t be imperfect forms of the Western paradigm, but would be 
different. Otherness is not colonizable; the only way to colonize someone is by 
transforming them into a sameness that leaves the foreign elements out. It 
amounts to a forced translation meant for a reader that has no shared identity with 
this Otherness; coincidentally this was the period were letters shaped the way on 
how the indigenous people were perceived by the Europeans, as such the 
knowledge was shaped for the receiver, more than it respected the locals, they 
were part of an adventure, but never a shaper of knowledge. That function 
remains only to those that are coeval to the knowers, and as we have seen, the 
indigenous people were denied this right. 
Let’s develop the argument by looking a Tzvetan Todorov ‘La Conquista de 
América: El Problema del Otro”, in this book Todorov points out the incapacity of 
the colonizers to recognize the Other as someone with the same dignity as them 
but different, he summarizes this in one phrase:  
Columbus has discovered the Americas but not the Americans.28  
   He points out that the colonizers negate the existence of a different human 
substance, and that they can only recognize an imperfect state of it. That means 
that the natives were either non-humans, being closer to the beasts than to man, 
or were just humans caught in a backwardness state of mind. 
Why does it have to be necessarily an imperfect state of man for the 
colonizers and not a different character? Because the imperfect state leaves the 
possibility of being perfected through a conversion into the Catholic Faith; the only 
way of imparting evangelization, is if there is a subject than can be evangelized, so 
the recognition of humanity comes at the price of a positioning of an imperfect 
knower. The Indians were inferior because they lacked the knowledge of Christ, 
they possessed the seeds of Christian qualities, but didn’t have them in practice. 
                                                 
28 Todorov, T. (1998: 57). My translation. 
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   Both Todorov and Mignolo claim that writing was one of the main instruments 
that colonizers used to legitimize these claims29. While the colonizers could 
recognize the rhetoric abilities, and the complex speeches that the Indians were 
capable of, they noticed that they lacked of a written tradition; this ‘lack’ put them 
on an inferior plane, they hadn’t yet ‘developed’ communication and their 
knowledge was inferior because it didn’t posses know the concept of a book. 
Absolute knowledge came from books, from the Sacred Scriptures to Nebrija’s 
grammar-nation founding of Spain, knowledge’s paradigm resided in the written 
word. Because of their lack of their written word, the colonizers assumed these 
people to lack history, so they brought them to themselves to bring them history. 
   In the ancient Greek world history, as it was for Herodotus, had been mainly a 
recollections about events that had been seen, thus contemporary to the knowers, 
one would start building history from the narratives and the voices of first-hand 
knowers, seeing that they were the one’s that had experience the events that 
unfolded, that was different from the way of understanding history for the Romans, 
for them history consisted on a narrative of past events, and it had to do more with 
identity building and was driven by a need to recover a past that they felt theirs.30 
   The colonizers view of history was more in sync with the latter, though their 
situation in the Americas resembled Herodotus condition the most. So they denied 
the second to the locals, while building one from both canons, constantly 
overlapping one view to the other. The alliance between memory, history, written 
word and knowledge between the Spanish colonizers that we could use Isidore’s 
of Sevilla explanation on why the letter is so useful for history: it is because the 
“letters tie things up” thus keeping them from: 
flying away with all those things that are forgotten.31  
   Because the populations they found in America had no alphabetic writing, they 
could not picture them having an actual history, how could they have accurate 
                                                 
29  See Todorov, T. (1998) and Mignolo, W. (1998). 
30 Mignolo, W. (1998: 136). 
31 As quoted in Mignolo, W. (1998: 138). 
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knowledge of their past and of the events if it wasn’t written down on a book? The 
Spanish tried to solve that problem writing their history for them; here the locals 
played a role only as bearers of information and not of producers of knowledge or 
active voices on how to structure it; whatever didn’t enter into the idea of history of 
the colonizers was left out, seen as discourses of different areas. The colonizers 
and the missionaries dictated what was important and what was not based on their 
own observations, when the locals were asked, it was always a question 
formulated by the colonizers, one that was meant to complete a questionnaire or a 
review, so the role the locals had was more of filling predetermined spaces, that 
not to produce or change the scheme of knowledge. 
   By doing this, they didn’t erase the voices of the local people, but they did 
absorb and repress their own visions, they reduce the population to mere carriers 
of information, but not carriers of knowledge nor history, they needed someone to 
complete their knowledge, to bring them into civilization, to convert them, and 
obviously, the ones that decided how to do it were the colonizers.  
 
2.3 Denial of Coevalness after the Colonization 
   We will try to argue that the denial of coevalness has been, and continues to be 
applied, around different disciplines and different discourses; and in all of them it 
entails an epistemic injustice on the other. In Latin American countries, “denial of 
coevalness” exists, and shadowing or obscuring these relations would be just a 
negation of the circumstances in which these countries are configured. We think 
that by analyzing the instances where these practices commit that epistemic 
injustice, will help us to recognize and restructure the way we’ve been talking 
about the thinking of the Other, to a way of starting a dialogue with the Other. 
Guillermo Bonfil-Batalla, among others, has explored how the independence 
movements were not enough to remove the colonization mentality, as they usually 
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were led by the criollos32, maintained the goals of their precedents and try to 
emulate the “European” countries, so the believe that the independence translated 
to a shift of epistemic relations, is not as accurate as most people assumed; the 
criollos were not mainly interested in shifting their views on the locals, but of 
obtaining more power and recognition. The indigenous side was more neglected 
on the nation building that consulted with, so that the solidifying of these nations 
were built more on the mix of the sons and daughters of spaniards than not of a 
truly multicultural exchange. 
   This situation led to an uneven focus on how the nations should focus their 
infrastructure or their political identity, rarely did “Latin American” countries went 
and have gone beyond a mestizo identity33, that while important, it is not enough 
for an epistemic injustice to disappear, one current example is the distribution of 
primary education in Mexico, where it is believed that indigenous schools are 
deficient, because the indigenous students have either an unwillingness to learn, 
or that the community is to chaotic and savage for them to really take advantage of 
the education given by the state, these opinions neglect the fact that eighty 
percent of the teachers do not speak the indigenous tongue of their students, thus 
making basic communication challenging, let alone any pedagogical practice34. 
Another problem is the uneven focus and essentialization of indigenous groups; 
the attention that the Mayans, Mexicas and Incas have gathered, has made their 
cultures and their people garner more respect, but it has also produced a further 
marginalization to smaller groups as they are reduced to these identities of which, 
if they don’t fit, then they suffer the consequences of not being considered as 
cultural as them.  
                                                 
32 Sons of Spaniard parents that, because they were born in the colonies and not in Spain, had less rights 
than the Spanish who were born in Spain. 
33 Mestizo refers to a child born from a Spanish and Indigenous parents, a mestizo identity implies a 
recognition of both backgrounds. 
34 See Mexicanos Primero (2017). 
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   We can thus see that these practices have not disappeared, so we find it 
important to explain how they came to solidify through time. As we said on 
previous paragraphs, both in the colonization period as well as the post-
independence period, in a less clear way, tended to disregard the local knowledge 
of their inhabitants, and the way that “Latin America” has been described shows 
that it is still a lack of something, the “Third World”, the “underdeveloped” 
countries, have to try to catch up to the Western Time. If they ever hope to do so, 
they have to look at what the Western World is doing, on this framework 
Indigenous knowledge becomes excluded from the debate. They become 
marginalized, they are shadowed, they’re only thought as remains of great 
civilizations that are no more. Five hundred years have passed and yet the notion 
is that nothing has changed with Them, that there is nothing more that we can 
learn, that their “Glory days” are over, and that the main interest we can get from 
them is just a historical look at a past that we don’t even feel like ours. The way we 
frame the indigenous cultures is to trap them on a past that is over, one that we 
prevent to bleed onto the present, thus neutralizing and silencing their voices. The 
disconnection we have with our indigenous populations, outside of history books is 
one of marginalization and denial, there is a territorial marginalization as with the 
tarahumara population, as well as a denial of recognition as we can see by people 
claiming to not have anything of indio; as if being an “indio” was a negative 
condition, almost a sickness that we want to avoid contagion of. By recognizing 
the indigenous only on their past, we negate their presence on our Time; as soon 
as that happens we reduced their opinions to what we already knew from the 
history books, in some cases, while going further to re-placing them as savages or 
as backward human beings, seeing their lack of some general traits shared in 
“our” society as a lack of humanity or development, “necessary” development for 
being accepted into the civilized world. 
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   Their becoming epistemic objects, and not epistemic agents, seems very familiar 
to what we saw in the chapter of epistemic injustice, we can see that denial of 
coevalness may be linked and further aggravates different epistemic injustices 
such as Testimonial Injustice, and injustice based on the group a person belongs 
to35. In this the people are excluded of the Hermeneutical Resources, their 
influence is limited and their accounts are dubious at best. Insurrection can only 
further damage the idea and essentialization we have of a group, forming and 
confirming a violent-primitive-natural characteristic that has been attributed in the 
past.  
   The legitimacy of their practices and the effect they can bring to societies are 
always questioned, if they even manage to be heard. Because of the denial of 
coevalness we don’t think they can or should affect Our Time, what epistemic 
abilities are there left after such denial? 
 
2.4 Sketches of coevalness in Johannes Fabian’s and Walter 
Mignolo’s theories. 
   As we have seen both Fabian and Mignolo reflect on the damage that the denial 
of coevalness produces on epistemic, cultural and political exchanges, both 
investigate different fields where this happens, and try to point out the injustice or 
the lack of epistemic justification to act in that specific way. Johannes Fabian is 
amazed on how anthropologists are able to submit the Intersubjective Time they 
experienced while doing ethnological work to an academic writing that demands 
an object of study. The contributions Fabian has made in recognizing the injustice 
of denying time to people we share it with, a time that is needed and in which 
communication is based on, and how it is linked to the development of European 
                                                 
35 Gender and Race certainly play a role on the denial of coevalness, but to explore this topic we would 
require more space to deal with it. For a deeper insight see Lugones, M. (2008), Fanon, F. (2008), and 
Quijano, A. (2007). 
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thought cannot be understated; Fabian’s book is an appeal of conscience, a 
demand for a renewal of anthropology, as well as a renewal of how we speak of 
the other, to an invitation to speaking with the other, that not only means not 
possessing all the knowledge, or potential frameworks for the conversation, it also 
means that we must listen and discuss so that share topics and share time may 
arise. 
   Walter Mignolo’s critique of the denial of coevalness is not a mere reappraisal of 
Fabian’s points; Mignolo’s book is one that not only asks for the same openness to 
diverse ways of thinking and practices, it is also a study that demonstrates the 
unjust invalidation of some practices, so that we may reconsider their epistemic, 
cultural and political relevance in today’s world. Mignolo wants to disassociate 
himself from Postcolonialist theory, because he believes that the name reeks of an 
answer to a move, and one that arises after the colonizers have left the territory, 
physically if not ideologically, from the colonized territories; he believes that 
position deligitimizes the practices that are born before and as soon as the colonial 
period begins, these practices don’t appear out of nowhere and he believes that 
we need to consider them as a new tradition from the colonial encounter. 
Mignolo’s critique, then, does not stop with an explanation of the epistemic 
injustice, but it is an invitation to revise the practices and thoughts that were 
deligitmized, to open up the historical and cultural background into zones that 
have been marginalized. 
   What solutions do Fabian and Mignolo offer for the denial of coevalness? 
Johannes Fabian is very ambiguous on this part, sometimes seemingly saying that 
ethnological practice would be enough, making dubious the role than an 
anthropologist as himself can play on the knowledge regarding indigenous groups. 
On other sections it seems that the only way would be to always have 
Intersubjective Time as the main focus of every epistemic relationship, yet Fabian 
never really describes how Intersubjective Time could happen with more than two 
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individuals, he seems to reduce it to a one on one encounter, where both knowers 
are recognized by the other as such, and in which they share a time on which to 
build any meaningful interaction; is that something that could happen between 
groups of people? How could one deal with that on a university course? Or on an 
exchange where the Other does not appear if not as referent? How do we solve all 
this issues are things that can not be answered based on Fabian’s book, he 
provides us with a way to recognize a denial of coevalness and its harms, but he 
does not offer a way to truly instaurate a coeval experience. A further “limitation” 
on Fabian’s book, is that he is solely concerned with the practices and writings of 
anthropologists, while we deal with the denial of coevalness as a phenomenon 
that happens in everyday life. Fabian mentions that denial of coevalness is not a 
phenomenon restricted to anthropology, yet it is not his focus to explore this side, 
both Mignolo and this work try to provide a further examination to this fields. 
  Walter Mignolo is more specific, he claims that we have to deny the denial of 
coevalness for us to open up an alternative way of interacting with the knowledge 
of the Other as well as with the Other, we could say to prevent an epistemic 
injustice from happening, with that he means that we have to restructure how 
indigenous knowledge has been perceived, be it an ‘exotic’ knowledge, a 
‘backward’ knowledge, or a knowledge that belongs entirely to the past, and 
accept it as part of the same time, that means to recognize that Guaman Poma 
Ayala did not live on a different time than Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, but that 
their writings were coeval, as well as their opinions. Mignolo clearly states:  
(...) one of my main efforts was to postulate a denial of the denial of coevalness by spatializing time 
and by suggesting coevolutionary histories as alternatives to evolutionary ones told from a locus of 
enunciation created as the master locus.36 
   This idea to disconnect a regional way of thinking that pose itself as universal 
through power relations and, thus opening up the space for different conceptions 
that have evolved through time is the first step to allow us to speak with the Other, 
                                                 
36 Mignolo, W. (1998:329). 
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and engage in a just epistemic exchange. His book shows us how traditions that 
were banished from the epistemic standards of knowledge from the West didn’t 
dissapear, they either evolved in isolation, merged and hybridized with the 
knowledge and practices that the colonizers introduced, appropriating this 
practices and shaping them to the transformation of their own knowledge and 
practices.This makes us understand that there isn’t one universal chronological 
line of knowledge that develops and can assume and determine which practices 
belong in the present and which in the past, yet, while I  do find this proposal 
useful when we have to look on previous experiences, it seems more a solution 
that repairs the damage done, instead of being one that recognizes coevalness 
from the start. Mignolo’s option helps us to legitimize what history had 
deligitimized, but it does not solve the problem on how coevalness is still being 
denied on the present day, we need something more than a mere reparation, we 
need a concept of coevalness that includes the indigenous people from the outset. 
Mignolo's broadens the understanding and the instances where denial of 
coevalness happens, but we consider that his proposal of a denial of the denial of 
coevalness remains underdeveloped, making it hard to see if by denying a denial 
of coevalness, true coevalness is happening. 
   For us it seems that the main contribution that Mignolo and Fabian give is the 
critique of the situation, and the explanation on how this denial comes to solidify 
itself through time. It calls for a revaluation on how we relate to different 
discourses, be it political, epistemic, historical, anthropological where indigenous 
people and knowledge have been framed. It calls for a reaction on the 
marginalization and essentialization of people and convictions; the need for this 
revaluation is important, because until we can see the limits in which our society is 
built, it will be hard to change these limits into something possible. We first need to 
be aware of the problem so that we can face it, by looking into Mignolo’s and 
Fabian’s accounts we have explored the harms produced by denial of coevalness, 
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and we have venture to identify it as a kind of epistemic injustice. By denying 
coevalness we deny a true epistemic interaction with the Other, and by doing so 
we are harming his abilities as a knower, be it that we marginalize him from any 
epistemic encounter, or that we make their voices unreliable insofar as they are 
considered primitive, denial of coevalness is a distancing practice which prevents 
true epistemic encounters to occur.  
   Nonetheless we felt the need to express the “limits” on Mignolo’s and Fabian’s 
theories of coevalness as we believe that, while valuable, it is not enough to take a 
reactive stance, and to make the reflection on coevalness only of its negation, we 
must also search for ways to have a positive concept of it, one that goes beyond 
colonization and distancing practices, one that actually makes us share time with 
the Other. 
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3. A positive account of coevalness: José Ortega y Gasset 
concept of coevalness. 
 
3.1 Explaining Ortega y Gasset’s Coevalness  
   After seeing the negative effects that the denial of coevalness has caused we 
will try to find a dialogical alternative, ironically, on a Spanish author37: José 
Ortega y Gasset. José Ortega y Gasset thought on coevalness before Johannes 
Fabian and Walter Mignolo did, yet his starting point wasn’t the reflection of a 
dimension that was denied to some people, he thought about coevalness in 
positive terms, developing the concept around a group of questions regarding the 
problems on how to understand our lives and our connection to society, as well as 
a concept to help on historic research. By consequence, Ortega y Gasset’s 
concept of coevalness does not share the same genealogy as the one that Fabian 
and Mignolo share, yet we believe that some of his thoughts on coevalness may 
help us surpass some of the “limits” that we found in their respective accounts. We 
will explore in this chapter his account of coevalness, and then we will focus on the 
features we think will allow us to sharpen the concept of coevalness into a positive 
program, to think of coevalness not only as something that can be denied. 
                                                 
37  This choice is not only motivated by the fact that Ortega y Gasset has a different framework 
regarding coevalness, or that he thinks that to think of contemporaneity is not enough; but it 
also stems from the influence Ortega y Gasset’s thinking has had in the “Latin American” mind. 
Be it by his trips and publications in Argentina or by the exodus of his students to the area, for 
example Leopoldo Zea’s presence in Mexico. 
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Reconstructing the thought of José Ortega y Gasset is not an easy task, his 
philosophy is always concerned with the circumstance in which he found himself 
in; he was more concerned in having an influence on the society as a whole and 
not only on philosophical academia, for those reasons his writings and his 
university classes were always planned for being accessible, he preferred to write 
articles on the newspaper than to write books aimed at philosophy scholars, he 
was a circumstantial thinker, concerned with contextual issues that were plaguing 
either Spain as a country, the University as an institution, or just everyday life 
concerns such as how to address an acquaintance, yet that does not mean that he 
does not have a systematicity of thought, or that he didn’t develop constantly 
concepts, sharpening them throughout different writings and contexts. One 
preliminary concept that we have to mention is that for Ortega y Gasset, living is a 
constant task of interpretation, our life is not already defined, on the contrary it has 
the constant need of being defined and made sense of. 
   The main place where he tackles and develops the idea of coevalness is in the 
course “En Torno a Galileo”, a course open to everyone, the course consisted in 
ten lectures where he dwells on the concept of coevalness and how it is inserted in 
his “Theory of Generations”38. What does this theory of generations amount to? 
Ortega y Gasset believes that in every historical age, men are divided into three 
different groups, of which they belong to one. All of them inhabit the same space, 
at the same time, which makes all of them contemporaries of each other, but each 
group is distinguished because each of them has a system of concerns, beliefs 
and ideas that drive them, he calls this  common factors a “vital horizon”, a horizon 
that we constantly face to define, make sense, and live our lives; one shares this 
“vital horizon” only with the group they appertain, and not with the rest of their 
contemporaries. This sub-group is the one that Ortega y Gasset defines as coeval.  
                                                 
38 See Ortega y Gasset, J. (1947a). 
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   Being coeval with someone doesn’t mean to agree with him on every topic, it 
does not mean to share the exact same opinion, it fundamentally means that 
coevals share the same problems and, be it in agreeing or opposing the dominant 
of ideas of their time, they can recognize each other because they all belong to the 
same dynamic system of attractions and repulsions, their vital horizon makes them 
share a set of questions, one that they have to attempt to reply to so that they can 
make sense of their lives, thus this shared vital horizon, our belonging to a coeval 
group, is fundamental for our interpretation and definition of our lives. Being a 
contemporary means to share the same space in one’s life, in the same Physical 
Time, with other people, being coeval means to engage in a vital manner with the 
ideas of the others, there is not a single universal approach on how one will face 
this engagement, thus plural answers ideas, and movements appear from a 
shared vital horizon, this engagement is fundamental so that we can define the 
characters of our life. Being coeval is not a condition that one can decide to grant 
to some individuals and deny to others, being coeval is a condition in which 
everyone is born with because the “vital horizon” of one’s life necessarily clashes 
and depends with the vital horizon of the others. 
   Every “today”, a specific date in Physical Time, is filled, for Ortega y Gasset, by 
three coeval generations, so every today is always a superimposition of different 
vital horizons extending through a shared space. Each generation is always 
positioned between two others, so a generation never finds itself isolated from the 
others, there’s always continuity between generations and even change in 
paradigms show how closely knitted together one generation is to the other. A 
change of paradigm never occurs spontaneously, it can only happen with a shift of 
a shared vital horizon, there has to be an understanding of the paradigm one 
wants to break with, and a shared new horizon which one wants to strive for; and 
until a full generation does not shape this new horizon, the shift will not realize 
itself, there will not be a true change of paradigm, because the shared vital horizon 
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will still be in place; that means that the vital horizons change only with 
generations and not with individuals, an individual may already break from the 
paradigm, but finds himself bounded to the unwillingness of his coevals to change 
it, so he must structure his severance from the paradigm with the refusal to break 
from it of his coevals.  Why is the theory of generations and, specifically, 
coevalness in Ortega y Gasset so important? As we have seen it has to do with a 
definition of a human subject that he gives, and to further clarify it we refer to his 
most famous formula: 
Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia, y si no la salvo a ella no me salvo yo.39 
   At its core, for Ortega y Gasset, the individual is always inserted in a 
circumstance with which he has to face so that his life may develop; an individual 
is never only just himself, but he is always thrown into a situation, one that he 
didn’t choose but, in a sense, cannot avoid. While this circumstance is common to 
all of his contemporaries, the main conceptual and interpretative tools and beliefs 
he will have to take on this circumstance are the same as his coevals, thus making 
them an essential factor of his life, they are the one’s with which he will forge the 
vital horizon of his age, be it by opposing them or by cooperating with them. To be 
coeval is to have to deal with one another in an attempt of an interpretation of the 
world, one that an individual cannot make on his own. So who wouldn’t be coeval? 
Those who do not share the same problematic than us, those whose life is 
surrounded by different questions, questions from which they will shape their lives; 
that is the distinction that Ortega y Gasset uses to explain what will separate 
coevals from contemporaries. 
   Coevalness, for Ortega y Gasset, means the condition where people share a 
common problem or question that pesters their life, one that must be answered in 
one way or another; the answers may be completely diverse, but the problem is 
felt by the society at large, this does not mean that every single person will feel the 
                                                 
39 ߧI am myself and my circumstance, and if I don’t save it, then I won’t save myselfߨ. My translation. 
Ortega y Gasset, J. (1947b). 
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problem with the same intensity, but everyone will find himself using convictions 
from previous generations, that thus become part of our own, and even if we are 
against them, we must know them; these convictions are formed and passed 
through diverse means, be if by family members, by school, or by other social 
groups, we constantly absorb these convictions; in a way, Ortega y Gasset says, 
our first way of thinking is always a foreign thinking, one that appertains to 
something and someone beyond ourselves40. An individual has to go through 
his/hers society shared conceptions before he can go through his own. 
Coevalness thus means a shared conceptual scheme, even if there are more than 
one, and a shared life problematic, it is through these shared mentalities, these 
ideas will be valid even if I do not share them, and convictions that every person 
will build his or her own conceptions of the world, be it that they choose not to alter 
any opinion of what they have received, or that they will change every single 
conviction they possessed to forge a new interpretation of the world. 
   A further clarification is necessary, as we said at the beginning of this chapter, 
we’re only taking some features of Ortega y Gasset’s theory on coevalness, as we 
do not agree with some of its features, on of these features is the fifteen-year 
range that a coeval group possess with each other; he believes that the intimacy 
of ideas is just shared by people belonging to this group, while people outside 
might think similarly, they still belong to another generation, we believe that one of 
Ortega y Gasset’s greatest merits is determining that coevalness is a shared 
problematic that people face, having the constraints of a fifteen-year range seems 
to harm more this idea, than to develop it. Another factor connected to his theory is 
that he thinks that a certain time has only three generations, those belonging to a 
coeval group formed by people from thirty to forty-five years, those belonging to a 
coeval group formed by those people who have from forty-six to sixty years and, 
finally, those belonging to a coeval group formed by those who have sixty-one to 
                                                 
40 See Ortega y Gasset, J. (1947a). 
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seventy-five years; the exclusion of certain groups as being able to be truly coeval 
outside of this framework seems unwarranted, and it is also a bizarre choice, 
seeing how in another essay41 he talks about coevalness as an instinct that 
children possess, and something that was common with the youth in antiquity, the 
same youth that would be through this coevalness instinct that the notion of 
society would arise. Even though we have decided not take into consideration 
these specific features that Ortega y Gasset discusses on his thinking, we still 
believe there are some notions inside his theory that will help us formulate a new 
concept of coevalness. 
  Ortega y Gasset thought that the coevals were restricted to a geographical 
space, meaning that the coevals in Europe could not be coeval to those in 
Australia, seeing that they have different “vital horizons”, thinking that the concerns 
and the problems that structures the European societies were different than those 
that concern Australians. He does not think that a society has to forcefully be 
isolated because of an essential trait, far from it, he thinks that societies fluctuate 
between being inserted on a homogenous coevalness with others and with periods 
of a heterogenous coevalness because of specific events that define that region of 
humanity. What would the “Latin American” case amount to given these 
conditions? Certainly there are different groups, and different traditions, but do 
these vital horizons differ that much? Should they? It seems to me that here the 
vital horizons interconnect with each other, the concerns of both the “main” society 
and that of indigenous groups clash again and again on certain issues, 
fundamental for them to define their world; be it the treatment of nature, the 
definition of territory, the need and means of expression or even the education, 
these societies continue to interact with one another making their vital horizons 
conflict and. at times, merge with one another. 
                                                 
41 See Ortega y Gasset, J (1947c). 
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   Because of this turn of events, the Indigenous people cannot remain 
marginalized, their vital horizon does not belong to a different time, but it does cry 
to be heard and to be dialogued with. As Bonfil-Batalla says, the non-recognition 
of this other side of “Latin America” makes only a superficial understanding42 of 
one’s world, we need to discover and face the deepness of our cultures and 
conditions if we really want to build an inclusive society, and not one that is built on 
hierarchies. We believe that this factor of sharing a vital horizon may prove useful 
for achieving this goal. This idea of coevalness stresses that coevalness is a need 
for interpreting one’s surroundings, and to recognize our coevals is to recognize 
the characters whom we will have to confront and refer to, if we want to have a 
more complete interpretation of the world. 
   To summarize we believe that these traits of Ortega y Gasset’s theory of 
coevalness must be implemented so that a just epistemic exchange can occur, it 
has to come after we’re aware on how denial of coevalness produces epistemic 
injustice, and informed with the harms on how denial of coevalness affects the 
Other, these traits must build a bridge to the other: 
1. Coevalness is not something that a society or an individual decides to grant 
or deny, as could be the case with the missionaries, conquerors and 
anthropologists, but is defined by a structural problem that makes us face 
and cohabit with one another, making coevalness a condition in which we 
live in and not as society or individual decision. 
2. Coevals are recognized because of the shared need to interpret one’s 
world. Interpretations may be diverse, but the problem brings people 
together, it is from this common problem that the different answers and 
different interpretations of the world and life will be born; and it is this 
structural concern that will link us to all the different opinions and ideas from 
our coevals. Because these structural problems and ideas are the one’s 
                                                 
42 See Bonfil-Batalla, G. (199: 9-37). 
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that bring us together, the shared questions, not the shared answers are the 
ones that define us as coeval, no answer brings with itself a legitimization of 
a new time, so there is no justification that a shared answer allow us to 
deny coevalness to different answers from our coevals. 
 
3.2 Final account of coevalness 
   We believe that José Ortega y Gasset’s theory cannot stand on its own, if we 
want to face the denial of coevalness as an epistemic injustice. The main problem 
is that Ortega y Gasset is not aware that coevalness may be denied to people with 
whom we share problems, even more, his own framework is one where people 
that share problem are still excluded from being coeval. We believe that these 
theory by itself could finish in producing the same distancing harms which Fabian 
and Mignolo try to explain. Thus we believe that the features we highlighted in 
Ortega y Gasset’s theory have to be grounded on the awareness of denial of 
coevalness that we explored in section 2. Ortega y Gasset lack the awareness of 
the epistemic harm that denying coevalness could produce, yet this awareness 
may have been overloaded in Mignolo’s and Fabian’s accounts, prohibiting them 
from fully being able to think about coevalness as a positive term, one that allows 
an epistemic interaction where different answers share a same question, and 
different interpretations clash and mix with each other, providing a shared 
epistemic arena, based on the vital part that these epistemic matters have on the 
shaping of our lives. Coevals are people who challenge and deepen our 
understanding of the world, and of ourselves, to deny them this dimension harms 
all the parties involved, and damages an epistemic interaction which is 
fundamental for a society. 
  We believe that both a denial of the denial of coevalness, and an affirmation of 
coevalness are necessary to have just interactions, for a creation of an epistemic 
arena where different voices may be heard without relationships of power 
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determining whose epistemic framework may organize the whole encounter. Paulo 
Freire’s pedagogy offers us already an example of having a dialogue with the 
Other and not about the Other. His pedagogy is based on the belief that one must 
create an epistemic program that develops from the concerns of its students, one 
that grows through collaboration and confrontation between teacher and students, 
thus making them both recipients and shapers of a pedagogical program. It is 
through this constant confrontation, that does not mean agreement, that we may 
really seek a just epistemic exchange, lacking an awareness of a denial of 
coevalness could prevent us from recognizing epistemic devices that distance the 
other interlocutor, harming him as an epistemic agent; but not focusing on the 
condition of coevalness itself may produce us to only take a reactionary stance on 
these issues, instead of being aware that coevalness is something we share from 
the outset, and we must strive to maintain it if we want a deeper understanding of 
the circumstance that surrounds us. As Ortega y Gasset, an honest thought is 
dialectic, and dialectic is collaboration43. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In section 1 of this thesis we discussed what we thought constituted an 
epistemic injustice, remarking that is the systematic harm done to an individual 
regarding their epistemic abilities as a knower, based on an external factor. We 
said that an epistemic injustice is a lack of recognition of an individual's epistemic 
qualities as a knower. Subsequently we identified denial of coevalness as an 
epistemic injustice, pointing out that when coevalness is denied, a distance is 
produced, and this distance allows to ignore the epistemic qualities of an 
epistemic agent, positioning certain abilities as not fully developed because of this 
individual’s place in Time. In section 2 we discussed both Johannes Fabian’s, 
                                                 
43 See Ortega y Gasset, J. (1992a). 
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which focuses mainly on anthropological discourse and practices, and Walter 
Mignolo’s, which broadens the scope both in practices and in time, theories 
regarding the denial of coevalness. We stated that for both of them denial of 
coevalness is a condition where some individuals or groups are pushed and 
excluded from an epistemic encounter, were misunderstandings reign. When we 
deny coevalness in an interaction there is no true communication, the individual or 
group who has been denied coevalness is in a disadvantaged position, one in 
which his epistemic expression and resources are going to be measured in a way 
in which they belong to the past, excluding this positions from playing a role in 
epistemic matters concerning the society. We also learn that this denial of 
coevalness isn’t something that happened exclusively in the past, but is 
something that the indigenous populations in America still suffer from. The 
structures that were used to colonize and discredit their practices are still in play 
today. In section 3 we explore José Ortega y Gasset’s positive account of 
coevalness, believing that through it we may find a foundation for new ways of 
communication and cooperation between different societies.  
   By producing conscience of the damage a denial of coevalness produce, by the 
analyses of Mignolo and Fabian, and with the positive account of Ortega y 
Gasset’s coevalness we hope to give a term that will stabilize epistemic equity for 
a cultural encounter, one that will avoid essentialization or prejudice; one that, if 
respected, will give us a chance to build better communication, and to revise how 
the institutions and our relationships with these past and present have been set.  
 
 
 
Summary: 
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   In this thesis we explore the idea of denial of coevalness as an epistemic 
injustice. We start by defining what we consider are the relevant factors of an 
epistemic injustice and why we consider that the denial of coevalness can be 
thought of as a kind of epistemic injustice, we then proceed to tackle the idea of 
denial of coevalness produce by two studies, one by Johannes Fabian, the other 
by Walter Mignolo; we highlight the fundamental epistemic injustice that denial of 
coevalness produces, trying to understand how it came to be and how it is 
maintained, then we confront our reflections with the concept of coevalness as 
proposed by José Ortega y Gasset, building from this three projects so that we 
can, not only identify denial of coevalness as an epistemic injustice, but point out a 
possible solution as well. 
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